Application of propensity scores to explore the effect of public reporting of medicine use information on rational drug use in China: a quasi-experimental design by Xiaopeng Zhang et al.
Zhang et al. BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:492
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/492RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessApplication of propensity scores to explore the
effect of public reporting of medicine use
information on rational drug use in China:
a quasi-experimental design
Xiaopeng Zhang, Lijun Wang and Xinping Zhang*Abstract
Background: Transparency has become a hottest topic and a growing movement in the health care system
worldwide. This study used a quasi-experimental design method to explore whether public reporting of medicine
use information can improve rational drug use.
Methods: 20 township hospitals and 274 doctors of City Y in Hubei Province, China were divided into the
intervention and control groups on the basis of their characteristics. In the intervention group, the values and
rankings of the average expenditure per prescription, percentage of prescriptions requiring antibiotics and
percentage of prescriptions requiring injections of each hospital and doctor were publicly released to patients and
doctors in an appropriate format monthly. Data were gathered both four months before and after the intervention.
Propensity score matching (PSM) was used to minimize the observed covariate (gender, age, experience, education
level, title, and monthly income) differences in the doctors’ characteristics. 108 pairs of doctors were obtained after
PSM. Chi-square test and t-test were employed to explore the effect of public reporting of medicine use information
on rational drug use. The study was approved by the Committee of Tongji Medical College, Hua Zhong University of
Science and Technology (IORG No: IORG0003571).
Results: In baseline, the average expenditure per prescription of the 274 doctors was 42.82 RMB yuan (USD 6.97), the
percentage of prescriptions requiring antibiotics was 63.00%, and the percentage of prescriptions requiring injections
was 70.79%, all higher than the average of Hubei Province and the standard recommended by WHO. Before the
intervention all the three indicators were all comparable (p > 0.05), whereas after the intervention, a significant
difference (p < 0.05) was found for the percentage of prescriptions requiring injections between the intervention
(64.66%) and control groups (70.52%).
Conclusions: Irrational drug use remains a policy issue in township hospitals in the study area. We demonstrated
that publicly reporting medicine use information could decrease the percentage of prescriptions requiring injections
in township hospitals in China, but this effect was not observed on prescription costs and antibiotics use. Analyses of
the mechanism and long-term effect of public reporting of medicine use information are recommended for further
studies.
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Transparency has become one of the hottest topics in the
health care system worldwide. The Institute of Medicine
defined health care transparency as making health care
available to the public in a reliable and understandable
manner, with a primary focus on the reporting of infor-
mation and processes [1]. In this study, we discuss public
reporting of information. According to the literature,
health care transparency can: (a) ensure that consumers
make informed health care choices; (b) increase trust in
the patient–physician relationship and health care systems;
(c) improve performance (quality, safety, and efficiency)
throughout the health care system because of competition
and/or availability of clinical benchmarks [2,3]. Berwick
proposed that public reporting can improve perform-
ance via two pathways, the selection and the change
pathways [4]. In the selection pathway, patients or their
intermediaries compare publicly released performance
data and reward the better-performing providers by
“selecting” (rewarding, recognizing, or paying) that pro-
vider. In the change (or quality improvement) pathway,
performance data help providers identify areas in which
they underperform and improve their performance
accordingly [4-6].
In fact, public reporting of quality information is a
growing movement in many countries. In US health care
system, almost every state has quality reporting programs
for hospitals, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services has initiated public disclosure programs for
hospitals, managed care plans, nursing homes, and home
health agencies [7]. In South Korea, a national insurance
review agency has been publicly releasing information
about antibiotics use rates among health care organiza-
tions since 2006 [8]. Some other countries have also
attempted to develop and collect quality measures that
capture consumer experience with health care systems
[9]. In 2009, the Chinese government established the
document “Views on Deepening the Reform of Medical
Care System”, which points out the importance of
increasing drug regulatory transparency. Certain links in
the drug-use segment, such as antibiotics use, prescrip-
tion comment, drug expenditure reimbursement, and so
on, were very important parts of the regulation and were
also the most urgent parts that have to be transparent.
Many local governments had done certain attempts, but
no results have been published yet.
As public reporting rapidly expands, several studies
have examined the effects of information disclosure on
quality in hospitals or nursing home markets. A review
synthesized the evidence for using publicly reported
performance data to improve quality, but found mixed
results [5]. After that, other studies have been published.
Won Mo Jang [10] found that repeated public releases on
Caesarean section rates had no significant effect onreducing Caesarean section rates. In addition, Bundorf
[11] evaluated a reporting program for Medicare HMOs
and found that public reporting has no significant posi-
tive effect on quality. However, Rachel [12] found that
public reporting in post-acute care setting had mixed
effects in areas without public reporting, which improved
in high-ranking facilities but worsened in low-ranking
facilities. Jung also reported that release of quality infor-
mation had a significant positive effect on the quality in
HMO markets during the earlier years of the voluntary
disclosure program. Hence, the effect, if any, these activ-
ities have on quality improvement is still unclear.
In view of methodology, few studies used quasi-
experimental method or had control groups. In Bundorf ’s
study, although a comparison group was set, a new policy
was implemented during the study period. Jung’s study
also had a control group, but it involved secondary
data analysis in which the confounding factor was
not matched. Hibbard [13] used a quasi-experimental
method and set control group, but the control group was
not randomly selected. Hence, a high-quality experimen-
tal or quasi-experimental design is needed to determine
whether public reporting of information has an effect on
quality improvement.
In our study, a quasi-experimental design method was
used to explore whether public reporting of medicine use
information can improve the doctor’s prescribing practice
in City Y, Hubei Province of China. The results can
enrich the evidence of health care transparency on qual-
ity and provide references for China and other countries
to promote health care transparency and rational drug
use.
Methods
Study design and setting
A quasi-experimental design was used, and the interven-
tion was implemented in November 2013. Our study
was conducted in City Y, a city located in the central
part of Hubei Province, China. Twenty township hospi-
tals (total 22) were selected as intervention group or
control group. First, Qianjiang had a total of 22 town-
ship hospitals. On the basis of hospital characteristics,
including service population, number of doctors and
outpatients, and revenue training times on rational drug
use, the 22 hospitals were numbered from 1 to 22 using
technique for order preference by similarity to an ideal
solution (TOPSIS) method, and the first 20 hospitals
were chosen as the sample. Second, starting with the
first hospital, the two hospitals that had the nearest
comprehensive evaluation index were chosen as a pair.
Hence, a total of 10 pairs were formed. Third, coin tos-
sing method was used to divide the two hospitals in each
pair into the intervention group and the control group.
In the end, each group had 10 hospitals.




Group intervention group (1); control group (0)
Independent variable
Gender male (1); female (0)
Age (year) continuous
Experience (year) continuous
Education level high school or less (1); some college or
associates (2); bachelors or higher (3)
Title not certified (1); certified doctor (2); house
physician (3); doctor in charge of a case (4);
assistant director physician and above (5)
Monthly income (yuan) <1500 (1); 1501–2000 (2); 2001–2500 (3);
2501–3000 (4); >3001 (5)
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Medicine use information was made public to the pa-
tients and doctors in the intervention group, including
the values and rankings of average expenditure per pre-
scription, percentage of prescriptions requiring antibi-
otics, and percentage of prescriptions requiring injections
of each hospital and each doctor who had the privilege of
prescribing medications. First, the medicine use informa-
tion was calculated using the data from the information
system of the Health Bureau of City Y. To ensure the cor-
rectness of the calculations, six researchers participated
in this work and checked one another. Second, the infor-
mation was printed in the appropriate format in A3/A4
paper. Third, the researchers posted the A3 papers on
the bulletin board in the hall of hospitals and distributed
the A4 papers to each doctor and director of the hospi-
tals monthly.
According to Berwick’s theory, the intervention’s effects
might come from three ways: (1) patient’s rewarding the
better-prescribing doctors after seeing the medicine use
information; (2) pressure from the director of each hos-
pital to improve their ranking; (3) doctors’ effort to im-
prove prescription behaviors to gain more patients or
better reputation. However, in this paper, we do not dis-
tinguish the specific way from which the effect comes.
Data sources
First, in the baseline, the characteristics of all the doctors
working in the hospitals including gender, age, experi-
ence, education level, title, and monthly income were
surveyed. Second, the doctors’ prescribing information
was obtained from the information system of the Health
Bureau of City Y each month provided by professional in-
formation workers. Third, the doctors whose prescrip-
tions were more than 30 before (July to October 2013)
and after (November 2013 to February 2014) the inter-
vention were selected to be included in the analysis. Fi-
nally, 274 doctors were analyzed in this study, and all the
prescriptions of each doctor each month were calculated
to reflect each doctor’s prescription behavior.
To ensure quality during data collection, a survey guide
was set, and all the researchers were trained according to
the guide before the survey. A quality supervisor was also
assigned to check the work every day. For the quality as-
surance of data collection of the doctors’ prescription in-
formation, professional information workers were asked
to export data according to the format set, and a special
computer was used to store the data. All the data used in
this study was not freely available and we got the permis-
sion of the Health Bureau of City Y.
Statistical variables
A matched-pair design with PSM was used to analyze the
effects of the intervention on the doctors’ prescribingbehavior. Three indicators were used: prescription costs,
antibiotics use, and injection use. All the three indicators
were defined as two categorical variables. If the average
expenditure for the prescription of a doctor after the
intervention was lower than before, his or her prescrip-
tion cost was designated as a “decrease”, otherwise (if the
expenditure remained the same or was higher), it was
designated as a “not decrease”. If the percentage of the
prescriptions of a doctor requiring antibiotics after the
intervention was lower than before, his or her antibiotics
use was defined as a “decrease”, otherwise, a “not
decrease”. If the percentage of the prescriptions of a doc-
tor requiring injections after the intervention was lower
than before, his or her injection use was defined as a
“decrease”, otherwise, a “not decrease”.PSM
To balance the covariate difference between the interven-
tion group and the control group doctors, PSM was used
to evaluate the effects of intervention by comparing the
outcomes in the intervention group with the results in
the control group. Control group doctors are suitable
matches for intervention group doctors if they have simi-
lar observed characteristics as evaluated by a particular
distance metric, i.e., the propensity score from a logistic
regression model used in this study (Table 1).
PSM was implemented in two steps: (1) the conditional
probability of being highly compensated (i.e., the propen-
sity score) was calculated; and (2) the scores in close
proximity to the exposed propensity scores were selected
from the control group. Nearest-neighbor matching was
performed using a caliper value of 0.03 [14], and caliper
matching with one-to-one matches based on the propen-
sity scores was used in this study.
Table 2 Other characteristics of the investigated doctors





High school or less 84 (30.66%)
Some college or associates 139 (50.73%)
Bachelors or higher 51 (18.61%)
Title
Not certified 12 (4.38%)
Certified doctor 57 (20.80%)
House physician 60 (21.90%)










Age (year) 40 ± 9.91
Experience (year) 19.5 ± 12.25
Note: The total number of sampled institutions was 274. For continuous and
categorical variables, median ± standard deviation and frequency (percent)
were used, respectively.
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Independent sample t-test or chi-square test was used to
analyze the differences of the covariates between the
intervention and control groups before and after PSM. t-
test and chi-square test were used to estimate the associ-
ation between the intervention and the result indicators,
including prescription costs, antibiotics use, and injection
use. Statistical significance was accepted at p-value ≤0.05
(SPSS 12.0). The study was approved by the Committee
of Tongji Medical College, HuaZhong University of Sci-
ence and Technology (IORG No: IORG0003571), and the
274 doctors all provided written informed consent.
Results
Characteristics of the participating doctors
The average expenditure per prescription of the 274
doctors before the intervention was 42.82 RMB yuan
(USD 6.97, the exchange rate was US $1 = RMB 6.14 in
March 2014) and after the intervention was 46.68 RMB
yuan (USD 7.60). The percentages of prescriptions re-
quiring antibiotics of the 274 doctors before and after
the intervention were found to be 63.00% and 61.36%,
respectively. The percentages of prescriptions requiring
injections of the 274 doctors before and after the inter-
vention were found to be 70.79% and 66.02%, respect-
ively. Among the 274 doctors, 68 doctors (24.82%)
reduced the average expenditure per prescription, 123
doctors (44.89%) reduced the percentage of prescriptions
requiring antibiotics, and 192 doctors (70.07%) reduced
the percentage of prescriptions requiring injections
(Table 2).
Propensity score estimation
The doctors’ propensity scores were estimated using a lo-
gistic regression model of the probability of receiving the
intervention based on the following: gender, education
level, title, income, age, and experience. A total of 108
pairs were obtained after PSM. The utilization of the total
sample was 79% (216 out of 274). Table 3 shows the
covariate in the pre- and post-matched samples for the
intervention and control groups. A significant difference
was found between the income of the groups (p < 0.05).
After PSM, the difference was insignificant (p > 0.05).
Most variables obtained a high p-value after PSM.
Effect of the intervention on the doctors’ prescribing
behavior
Table 4 shows that the average expenditure per prescrip-
tion, percentage of prescriptions requiring antibiotics, and
percentage of prescriptions requiring injections in the base-
line were all comparable. After the intervention, a signifi-
cant difference (p < 0.05) for the percentage of prescriptions
requiring injections was found between the intervention
and control groups, but this difference did not exist for theindicators of average expenditure per prescription and per-
centage of prescriptions requiring antibiotics.
Table 5 clearly shows the changes in the doctors’ pre-
scription behaviors. After the intervention, 34.26% of the
doctors in the intervention group reduced the average
expenditure per prescription, whereas 47.22% of the doc-
tors in the control group reduced the average expend-
iture per prescription. Hence, no significant difference
was shown between the two groups (p > 0.05). The ratio
of the doctors who decreased the percentage of prescrip-
tions requiring antibiotics in the intervention group was
45.37%, which is higher than that in the control group
(41.67%), but no significant difference existed (p > 0.05).
Of the doctors in the intervention group, 39.81% reduced
the percentage of prescriptions requiring injections,
whereas 26.85% of doctors in the control group reduced
the percentage of prescriptions requiring injections.
These results exhibited a significant difference (p < 0.05).
The results from Tables 4 and 5 reveal that after the
intervention, more doctors reduced injection use, lead-
ing to the lower percentage of prescriptions requiring in-
jections in the intervention group than in the control
group.
Table 3 Variables for per- and post-matched samples for the intervention and control group
Variable name Pre-PSM approach Post-PSM approach
Control group Intervention group P value Control group Intervention group P value
Gender
Male 92 (64.34%) 80 (61.07%) 0.576 68 (62.96%) 70 (65.74%) 0.670
Female 51 (35.66%) 51 (38.93%) 40 (37.04%) 38 (34.26%)
Education level
High school or less 46 (32.17%) 38 (29.01%) 0.837 37 (34.26%) 34 (31.48%) 0.927
Some college or associates 70 (48.95%) 69 (52.67%) 0.752 50 (46.30%) 54 (50.00%) 0.733
Bachelors or higher (Refer) 27 (18.88%) 24 (18.32%) 21 (19.44%) 20 (18.52%)
Title
Not certified 5 (3.50%) 7 (5.34%) 0.199 5 (4.63%) 6 (5.56%) 0.433
Certified doctor 25 (17.48%) 32 (24.43%) 0.123 20 (18.52%) 25 (23.15%) 0.282
House physician 25 (17.48%) 35 (26.72%) 0.090 19 (17.59%) 27 (25.00%) 0.202
Doctor in charge of a case 78 (54.55%) 52 (39.69%) 0.618 56 (51.85%) 45 (41.67%) 0.677
Assistant director physician and above (Refer) 10 (6.99%) 5 (3.82%) 8 (7.41%) 5 (4.63%)
Monthly income (RMB yuan)
<1500 30 (20.98%) 33 (25.19%) 0.107 26 (24.07%) 33 (30.56%) 0.636
1501–2000 55 (38.46%) 46 (35.11%) 0.030 39 (36.11%) 41 (37.96%) 0.444
2001–2500 37 (25.87%) 25 (19.08%) 0.015 27 (25.00%) 20 (18.52%) 0.215
2501–3000 16 (11.19%) 13 (9.92%) 0.054 12 (11.11%) 7 (6.48%) 0.163
>3001 (Refer) 5 (3.50%) 14 (10.69%) 4 (3.70%) 7 (6.48%)
Age (year) 41 ± 9.92 38 ± 9.86 0.055 40 ± 10.74 39 ± 9.43 0.921
Experience (year) 20 ± 13.36 18 ± 10.82 0.088 20 ± 11.62 20 ± 10.19 0.822
Note: For continuous and categorical variables, median ± standard deviation and frequency (percent) were used, respectively. Differences between groups were
tested by independent t test (Mann–Whitney U test) for continuous variables and by chi-square test for categorical variables. All p-values were two tailed.
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To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first at-
tempt to evaluate the effect of publicly reporting medi-
cine use information on rational drug use in China. The
results show that before the intervention, the averageTable 4 Effect of the intervention on doctors’ prescribing










prescription of a doctor
(RMB yuan)
50.07 ± 24.90 43.62 ± 34.41 −2.530 0.110
Percentage of
prescriptions requiring
antibiotics of a doctor (%)
62.49 ± 21.64 60.97 ± 25.86 −0.107 0.915
Percentage of
prescriptions requiring
injections of a doctor (%)
64.66 ± 23.51 70.52 ± 25.57 −2.349 0.019
Note: Non-parametric tests were used because all the variables were not
normal; a stands for Mann–Whitney U test.expenditure per prescription of the 274 doctors was
42.82 RMB yuan (USD 6.97), the percentage of prescrip-
tions requiring antibiotics of the 274 doctors was
63.00%, and the percentage of prescriptions requiring in-
jections of the 274 doctors was 70.79%. According to a
paper published in health policy and planning (2013)
[15], by the end of 2011, the average expenditure per
prescription in Hubei Province was 26.67 RMB yuan
(USD 4.34) and the percentage of prescriptions requiring
injections was 59%. Hence, City Y has higher prescription
expenditure and ratio of injection than the average in
Hubei Province. However, the World Health Organization
(WHO) recommended that the percentage of encoun-
ters with antibiotics should range from 20.0% to 26.8%,
and the normal range of percent of encounters with in-
jections should be 13.4% to 24.1% [16,17]. Therefore,
the drug use in City Y is irrational and needs urgent
attention.
In our study, we demonstrated that public reporting of
medicine use information has a significant effect on the
injection use in the township hospitals of China. Public
release of doctors’ performance data can improve doc-
tors’ behavior in prescribing injections. From a policy
perspective, our study showed significant implications
Table 5 Effect of the intervention on result indicators
Variable name Intervention group Control group Total Chi-square value P value
Prescription costs Not decrease 71 (65.74%) 57 (52.78%) 128 (59.26%) 3.759 0.053
Decrease 37 (34.26%) 51 (47.22%) 88 (40.74%)
Total 108 (100.00%) 108 (100.00%) 216 (100.00%)
Antibiotics use Not decrease 59 (54.63%) 63 (58.33%) 122 (56.48%) 0.301 0.583
Decrease 49 (45.37%) 45 (41.67%) 94 (43.52%)
Total 108 (100.00%) 108 (100.00%) 216 (100.00%)
Injection use Not decrease 65 (60.19%) 79 (73.15%) 144 (66.67%) 4.083 0.043
Decrease 43 (39.81%) 29 (26.85%) 72 (33.33%)
Total 108 (100.00%) 108 (100.00%) 216 (100.00%)
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for evidence of regulatory measure. Making doctors’ and
hospitals’ information on injection use open would
improve the doctors’ prescription behavior and promote
rational drug use. However, the mechanism on how pub-
lic reporting of medicine use information affected injec-
tion use is not included in this paper and thus requires
further studies.
Although Berwick thought that the effect came from
the selection of consumers and the self-effort of
providers to improve [4], certain barriers may still exist.
Certain researchers believe that the selection of con-
sumer pathway may be interrupted by the low level of
awareness about the information [18-20]. For example, a
research found that only 12% of patients consider the
information released [21]. In our study, best effort was
exerted to disseminate the information in an appropriate
format and manner that was understandable and would
motivate the patients to act on the information; however,
the patients’ comprehension may be insufficient, which
became a barrier to consumers’ selection [22,23]. Other
researchers believe that to provide the best chance for
success, the release of information should follow certain
criteria such as accuracy, relevance, timeliness, cost-
effectiveness, and accountability [24]. Therefore, in future
studies, evaluating the format or way of information dis-
closure may be done. Although we tried to communicate
and convey medicine use information more effectively to
patients, patients might have little or no choice but to go
to the nearest hospital for reasons of district and policy
issues in China. Furthermore, the incentive to sustain the
effort of rational drug use can also affect doctor behavior
[10]. In our study, we reported three indicators to
patients and doctors, but we only saw the effect on injec-
tion use. Certain researchers found that the effect of
disclosure on quality depended on the type of services
[25,26], and in our research, the results indicated the
effect of disclosure on medicine use might depend on
different indicators, which still need further research.
These indicators might be the reasons why we did notsee the effects of public reporting of medicine use infor-
mation on prescription costs and antibiotics use.
From a methodological perspective, we have done a
quasi-experimental design to eliminate the difference of
institutions and used PSM to avoid the risks of selection
bias based on doctors’ characteristics in analyzing the
effect of public reporting of medicine use information
on rational drug use. By using logistic regression, the
propensity score was estimated with the intervention as
the outcome and the doctors’ characteristics as the pre-
dictive variables. A total of 108 pairs of doctors shared
close propensity scores, and similar characteristics were
included in our study. The uniformity in the measured
risk factor distribution indicates that the distribution of
unmeasured variables is balanced, although the propen-
sity scores cannot remove hidden biases except to the
extent that the unmeasured prognostic variables are
correlated with the measured covariates used to com-
pute the score. Therefore, efficient development of
health care policies can be supported using propensity
score analysis [27].
Our study also has certain limitations. First, the data
analyzed in our study were obtained four months before
the intervention and four months after the intervention;
hence, long-term effect was not discussed. However, we
believe that understanding the immediate effect of the
intervention is also important and could provide useful
implications. Second, we did not discuss the responses
of both patients and doctors, which would better explain
the findings in our research and needs further research.
Third, we did not evaluate the format or way of informa-
tion release. In addition, we did not include variables of
the patients in our analysis. Even though some re-
searchers used certain criteria, no indicator system has
been reported, indicating that much work still needs to
been done in this area.
Conclusions
Irrational use of drug is still a policy issue in township
hospitals in our study area. This study is the first attempt
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information on rational drug use in China. After control-
ling the difference of hospitals’ characteristics in design-
ing and using PSM to partially adjust the selection bias of
doctors’ characteristics, we demonstrated that public
reporting of medicine information could decrease the
percentage of prescriptions requiring injections in town-
ship hospitals of China. However, this effect was not ob-
served on prescription costs and antibiotics use. The
findings enrich the evidence of health care transparency
on quality and provide references for China and other
countries to promote health care transparency. Analyses
of the mechanism and long-term effect of public report-
ing of medicine use information are recommended for
future studies.
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